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Sequencing and Allocating Attorney
Time to Cases
STUART S. NAGEL*
The purpose of this article is to discuss how attorneys can better
sequence and allocate their time in processing cases by making use of
modern management science methods. Such methods can maximize
benefits while complying with ethical constraints. The article also
emphasizes making use of records that show the amount of time
spent on various cases and the results obtained. The records could
come from one's own firm or from a set of firms whose time-and-re-
sults records are available through a looseleaf service.
The article is divided into two parts. The first part of the article is
concerned with the order in which cases should be efficiently han-
dled. Ordering is necessary unless there are as many lawyers in the
law firm as there are cases. Then no case would be taken unless a
lawyer is free to work on the case. That way there is no backlog and
no need for sequencing. So long as there is a backlog of at least two
cases, there :is a need for the next available lawyer to decide the most
efficient order in which the cases should be processed. Processing
cases on a first-come, first-served basis may not be the most efficient
procedure from the perspective of maximizing the benefits minus the
costs of either the firm or the clients.1
* Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois; J.D. 1958, Northwestern
University Law School; Ph.D. 1961, Northwestern University Graduate School. Profes-
sor Nagel has been an attorney for the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, the
National Labor Relations Board, and the Legal Services Corporation. He is the author
of several books including Law, Policy and Optimizing Analysis, published by Green-
Quorum Press (1986), Using Personal Computers for Decision Making in Law Prac-
tice, published by American Law Institute-American Bar Association (1985), and Deci-
sion Theory and the Legal Process, published by Lexington-Heath (1979).
1. For literature on optimum sequencing of events as a management science
problem, see K. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO SEQUENCING AND SCHEDULING (1974); R.
CONWAY, W. MAXWELL & L. MILLER, THEORY OF SCHEDULING (1967); and S. RICH.
MOND, OPERATIONS RESEARCH FOR MANAGEMENT DECISIONS 461-480 (1968). No litera-
ture has been found dealing with optimum sequencing of cases in a law firm, but there
are articles dealing with optimum sequencing of cases in the judicial process. See
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The second part of the article is concerned with the amount of
time to devote to each case. Time allocation is necessary because de-
voting too little time to a case may result in losing a contingency fee
and may be unethical regardless of the fee arrangement. Likewise,
devoting too much time to a case may be wasteful under a contin-
gency fee or a flat fee, and may be unethical under an hourly fee.
One thus wants to find the optimum time level for each case where
doing too little or too much is undesirable.2 The time-allocation por-
tion of the article is shorter than the case sequencing portion because
the time allocation problem has been discussed in previously pub-
lished articles, but systematic case sequencing by lawyers has not
been previously analyzed.
I. PRELIMINARY INFORMATION
A. The Illustrative Data
Table 1 provides a set of hypothetical data that can be used to illus-
trate the principles of this article regarding optimum sequencing and
optimum time allocation levels. The data concerns twelve cases that
correspond to four casetypes. The four casetypes might be medical
malpractice, antitrust, product liability, and automobile accident
cases, or any set of casetypes as defined by the nature of the speciali-
zation of the law firm in question.3 In Columns 1 and 2, twelve sam-
Hausner, Lane & Oleson, "Automated Scheduling in Courts," in OPERATIONS RE-
SEARCH IN LAW ENFORCEMENT, JUSTICE, AND SOCIETAL SECURITY (S. Brounstein & M.
Kamrass eds. 1976); TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE COURTS 88-
90, 165-167 (1968); and Nagel & Neef, Time Oriented Models and the Legal process. Re-
ducing Delay and Forecasting the Future, WASH. U.L.Q. 467, 474-82 (1978). Optimum
sequencing in the judicial process is concerned mainly with reducing the average wait-
ing time, whereas optimum sequencing in the practice of law is concerned mainly with
maximizing income minus expenses.
2. For literature on finding an optimum level of activity where doing too much or
too little is undesirable, see M. WHITE, et al., MANAGING PUBLIC SYSTEMS: ANALYTIC
TECHNIQUES FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 278-90 (1980); and S. NAGEL, POLICY EVALU-
ATION: MAKING OPTIMUM DECISIONS 81-178 (1982). For applications to the problem of
how much time to allow court cases or stages in court cases, especially criminal cases,
see TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE COURTS 84-88 (1967); and
Nagel & Neef, Time Oriented Models and the Legal Process: Reducing Delay and Fore-
casting the Future, WASH. U.L.Q. 467, 490-494 (1978). For applications to the problem
of how much time attorneys should allow for civil cases, see F. MACKINNON, CONTIN-
GENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL ECONOMICS AND RESPON-
SIBILITIES (1964); Kritzer, et al., Understanding the Costs of Litigation: The Case of the
Hourly-Fee Lawyer, AM. BAR FOUNDATION RES. J. 559-604 (1984); and Nagel, Attorney
Time Per Case: Finding An Optimum Level, 32 U. FLA. L.R. 424-441 (1980).
3. The writer gratefully thanks Professor Arthur Robinson of the University of
Illinois, School of Engineering, for having suggested this data. It was originally part of
his class assignment designed to illustrate the use of dynamic programming as a form
of operations research. The data, however, can be more easily analyzed by following
the principle of choosing the cases in the order of their B/C ratios until one's budget or
time runs out. Dynamic Programming in this context involves choosing cases by going
through a series of stages and doing a separate optimizing at each stage. For literature
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ple cases are divided into four different types labeled A, B, C, and D.
Column 3 shows the hours spent on each of these twelve cases ac-
cording to the time and billing records of the law firm. The column
provides a measure of the cost incurred in each case, assuming that
an hour's time is worth $100 to a prominent law firm and also recog-
nizing that the arithmetic is simpler by using a round number. Other
variable costs could also be included for each case, as contrasted to
the fixed costs of the law firm which are not attributable to specific
cases. For the sake of simplicity, however, other variable costs are
left out.
Column 4 shows the fee obtained in each of these cases. The fee is
expressed in terms of benefit units, each one of which is worth $100.
Thus, the first case involved ten cost units or $1,000 and twenty-one
benefit units or $2,100. The numbers in the benefits column can be
considered as benefits that have already been discounted for the
probability of their being received and discounted for delay where
the payoff does not occur until substantially later.
Column 5 shows the benefit/cost ratio (hereinafter referred to as
B/C) or efficiency ratio for each case by dividing column 4 by column
3. Column 6 shows the benefit/cost difference or profit for each case
by subtracting column 3 from column 4. This article will help
demonstrate that the B/C ratios are needed for sequencing cases in
order to maximize total benefits minus costs of the firm over the
course of a year or other time period. This article will help demon-
strate that the B-C differences are also needed for allocating time to
each case in order to maximize total benefits minus costs of the firm.
Note that all the cases are predicted to be profitable in the sense
that the B/C ratio is greater than 1.00 and the B-C difference is al-
ways positive. Otherwise a firm would not deliberately take a case to
begin with, unless the firm is taking the losing case in order to please
the client who might later provide the firm with a big winner.
B. Predicting Costs and Benefits
A data table like Table 1 can serve two important purposes. One is
to make sequencing and allocating decisions where the data table
represents incoming cases that have not yet been processed. A sec-
ond purpose is to make predictions concerning incoming cases with
regard to how many hours each case is likely to consume and what
the benefits or income is likely to be from each case.
The predictive purpose, rather than the decision making purpose,
on a dynamic programming approach to this kind of data, see D. MEREDITH, et al., DE-
SIGN AND PLANNING OF ENGINEERING SYSTEMS (1985); see also G. NEMHAUSER, INTRO-
DUCTION TO DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING (1966).
1024
[Vol. 13: 1021, 1986] Allocating Attorney Time
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
can be used to predict future time consumption from a data table like
this by the following two steps:
1. Determine the casetype for the incoming case. Narrowly classifying the
cases may give precision in describing the cases, but if the categories are
too narrow, then the sample sizes may be too small to generalize from.
2. Observe the average number of hours for cases of the appropriate
casetype. For example, if an incoming case fits Casetype B, then it would
be reaonable to predict that the incoming case will probably take about
20 hours. We have three examples of Casetype B in our data table. They
took 10, 20 and 30 hours respectively, thereby averaging 20 hours for the
set of three cases.
There are more complicated ways of predicting how much time cases
will consume, but this method is sufficient for later illustrating what
one does with predicted case time.
One can likewise predict benefits or income per case using a simi-
lar two step approach.
1. Determine the casetype for the incoming case.
2. Determine the average benefits or income for cases of the appropriate
casetype. For example, if an incoming case fits Casetype B, then it would
be reasonable to predict that the incoming case will probably bring in
about )62/3 benefit units, or 54 benefit units, or $5,400.
II. OPTIMUM SEQUENCING
Suppose we now consider the data in Table 1 to represent twelve
incoming cases, rather than twelve past cases. Suppose further that
these cases represent the total backlog of our small law firm, and this
is the beginning of the week. In what order should we process these
cases?
Some attorneys might say, process the cases on a first-come, first-
served basis since that rule seems fair and it avoids having to think
about how -the sequencing could be done better. First-come, first-
served is not necessarily fair since it may mean that short cases and
others may have to wait a long time to be processed because a long
case came in ahead of them. If the cases are processed with the
shortest cases first, the average delay will be substantially reduced
without necessarily causing the maximum delay to become unreason-
able or unethical, assuming the long cases are flagged for processing
before they exceed a maximum constraint.
Other attorneys might say process the cases by a variety of se-
quencing methods that make no sense in terms of maximizing the in-
come minus expenses of the firm such as:
1. Take the shortest cases first to get them out of the way, rather than to
reduce the average delay to clients.
2. Take the longest cases first to get them out of the way.
1025
3. Take the most profitable cases first to bring in working capital.
4. Take the least profitable cases first to get them out of the way and to have
the more profitable cases to look forward to.
5. Other sequencing methods.
A. Sequencing by B/C Ratios
Before discussing the defects in the above methods, we should clar-
ify the correct method. It involves taking the cases in the order of
their benefit/cost ratios. Suppose we have a 40-hour week and one
attorney. How should that 40-hour week be most efficiently spent in
processing these twelve cases? We should take Case 2 first since it
has the highest benefit/cost ratio at 61/20 or 3.05. We should then
take Case 7 since it has the second highest benefit/cost ratio at 3.00,
although Case 11 also has a 3.00 B/C ratio. When two cases have the
same B/C ratio, prefer the case with the shorter hours in order to re-
duce the average waiting time per client. If we take all three cases,
the total number of predictive hours is 50 hours. That means the sec-
ond 10 hours of Case 11 are postponed or continued to next week.
If we follow that procedure, then we will have incurred 40 hours of
cost or $4,000. We will have obtained predicted benefits equal to 61
plus 30 plus half of 60, for a total of 121 benefit units, or $12,100. We
are figuring half the 60 benefit units for Case 11 because we have put
in half the predicted 20 hours that are needed to complete the case.
We could say there are no benefits until the case is completed. That
would be the equivalent of operating on a cash accounting system,
rather than an accrual accounting system, although the accrual sys-
tem generally makes more sense. As a compromise we could accrue
30 benefit units when we complete 10 of the 20 hours. After complet-
ing the full case and seeing the case took fifteen hours, we could then
adjust the benefit units we assigned to the previous week to be 10/15 or
2/3 of 60 benefit units which means 40 units rather than 30. Since re-
ports are normally only prepared on an annual basis, those adjust-
ments would only have to be made once per year in our time
efficiency records. Those adjustments would not have to be made at
all if we are just seeking to establish the proper sequencing rule.
Assuming the predicted benefits are reasonably accurate then we
will have made a profit of 121 minus 40 profit units, or a profit of
$8,100. There is no combination of cases that can add up to 40 hours
that would bring in a bigger profit. By sequencing the cases to bring
in bigger profits early, we are not going to change the total profit for
the twelve cases. The total profit for the twelve cases will still be 332
profit units. The advantage of collecting fees from the more efficient
cases first is that doing so enables us to obtain more working capital
as early as possible to plow into the development of the firm or to
invest for obtaining interest. Thus, if we add the interest obtainable
1026
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to the profit figures in column 6, the optimum sequencing of taking
the cases in the order of their B/C ratios will give us the greatest to-
tal profit plus interest.
B. Maximum Time Constraints as Supplements
If one strictly follows the optimum sequencing principle of taking
the cases in order of their B/C ratios, then a case with a low B/C ra-
tio like Case 9 might never be processed. To prevent that from oc-
curring, maximum constraints are needed on each case. Those
maximum constraints should reflect the statute of limitations and
whatever the attorneys involved consider to be a reasonable maxi-
mum. When the maximum date is approached, minus the predicted
number of working hours, minus some leeway for error, a good
scheduling system should flag the cases involved in order to get them
started and/or completed before the expiration of the time for start-
ing or completing them.
Another aspect of optimum sequencing that tends to keep the ac-
cepted cases with relatively low B/C ratios from being put off too
long is the optional rule that says at the beginning of each week or
other time period, new cases should be scheduled for getting started.
That means a low B/C case from last week should go ahead of a high
B/C case from next week. Thus, the sequencing by B/C ratios can be
just within a given time cluster or cohort. That rule is designed to
supplement the flagging system when optimum sequencing is used by
courts to reduce delay, although it does not have to be part of opti-
mum sequencing when used by law firms to improve their cash flow
for maximizing income minus expenses.
C. Sequencing by B-C Differences
The leading contender to sequencing the cases in the order of their
B/C ratios is the idea of sequencing them in the order of their B-C
differences. At first glance, that sounds reasonable since we want to
maximize benefits minus costs, but in terms of our annual or weekly
profit and loss statement, not in terms of the order in which we pro-
cess the cases.
If we process the cases in the order of their B-C differences, or
their individual profitability, then we would process Case 12 first, not
Case 2. Processing Case 12 would use 30 hours and bring in 85 bene-
fit units. We would then process Case 3 since it has the second high-
est B-C difference. Completely processing that case would consume
1027
an additional 30 hours, but we only have a 40 hour week. We there-
fore process only 10 of the 30 hours. As before, we prorate the 80
benefit units by only accruing one third to this week or 27 benefit
units. Adding 85 and 27 gives a total of 112 benefit units or $11,200.
The B/C sequencing gave $12,100 for the same 40 hours, although se-
quenced differently. This means by using B/C sequencing, we gained
an additional $900 that week to invest in the firm or to draw interest.
We could have used hypothetical numbers that would have made the
difference between the two approaches equal to $9,000 or $90,000,
rather than $900.
If we have the unusual situation where all the cases take exactly
the same amount of time, then sequencing by B-C would give the
same result as sequencing by B/C or by B alone. Likewise, if all the
cases produce the same benefits even though they vary in hours re-
quired, then sequencing by B-C would also give the same result as se-
quencing by B/C or by C alone. If all the cases had the same benefits
and costs, then one could get the same total profit by taking the cases
in any order.
D. Other Alternatives
B/C divided by C is referred to as the yield ratio. It can be inter-
preted as a percentage of profit returned to each hour. Thus a yield
of 2.00 means a 200% return of $2,000 on one's investment of $1,000
worth of time as shown in column 7 for Case 7. Sequencing in order
of yield gives the same results as sequencing in order of efficiency.
This is so because the yield ratio is always equal to the efficiency ra-
tio minus a constant 1.00. One can show algebraically that (B/C)/C
= B/C - C/C = B/C - 1, or the reverse. Using yield ratios involves
a little more arithmetic, but for many people such ratios are more
understandable to use in sequencing because they do include a profit
calculation in the numerator. The yield ratio is also useful later
when we deal with nonmonetary benefits.
At first glance, one might think that the sequencing solution might
be influenced by the order of the listing of the cases, and that we
would obtain a different result if the cases were listed from Case 12
down to Case 1 instead of from Case 1 up to Case 12. There would be
a difference in the sequencing, but not in the bottom-line profit of to-
tal benefits minus costs. If the cases were reversed, the best case to
take first would still be Case 2 for 20 hours. The second case, though,
now would be Case 11 rather than Case 7. If we take Case 11 for its
20 hours, then we have used our 40 hours. The total benefits would
be 61 for Case 2 and 60 for Case 11 for the same total of 121 and
$1,200. This is so because Case 11 has the same B/C ratio as Case 7,
1028
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and the B/C ratios do not change as a result of how the cases are
listed and -thus seen.
To unde:rstand optimum sequencing, it is also helpful to show the
defects in other forms of sequencing which would not produce opti-
mal result;. For example taking the shortest cases first to cover our
40 hours would mean Cases 1, 4, 7, and 10. The total benefits would
then be 21 plus 20 plus 30 plus 25 for a rather low 96 or $960. Taking
the shortest cases first is the optimum sequencing approach for mini-
mizing average waiting time rather than maximizing profit. It is thus
a useful sequencing method for the courts to use in sequencing court
cases subject to maximum time constraints.
Taking the cases in the order of their benefits and ignoring costs
will result in a lower total profit than the $12,100 of B/C sequencing.
By coincidence with the data in Table 1, the sequencing by benefits is
the same as the B-C order because Cases 12, 3, and 2 are the three
best cases on both benefits and benefits minus costs, although only
Case 2 is in the top three on the more important criterion of the B/C
ratio. We could easily change that coincidence by assuming that Case
3 requires 40 hours. Then Case 3 would no longer be in the top three
on B-C but would still be in the top three on total benefits. If we
then allocate 30 hours to Case 12 and the remaining 10 hours to Case
3, we would receive 85 benefit units plus one fourth of 80 for a total
of 105, or only $10,500.
From this analysis of alternatives to B/C sequencing and the previ-
ous analysis of the benefits of B/C sequencing, one can conclude that
it is the most meaningful way to efficiently sequence cases in a law
firm backlog. That is partly why it is called the efficiency ratio. One
must, however, emphasize that sequencing by B/C ratios is only a
means to a higher goal which is maximizing total benefits minus
costs.
.II. SEQUENCING FROM DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES
A. Lawyers for Civil Defendants
Suppose Table 1 were viewed from the perspective of a law firm
that only does defense work in damages cases. Therefore, all the
figures in column 4 are detriments or additional costs, and not bene-
fits from the defendant's perspective if those are amounts that are
likely to be paid out. Assume also for the sake of simplicity that the
defense side has to put in as many hours preparing and conducting
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each case as the plaintiff side does. How then, should a defense firm
sequence these 12 cases?
At first glance, the answer might be to delay the biggest payout
cases as long as possible and therefore take the smallest payout cases
first which would mean Cases 1, 4, 7, and 10. The total payout for
those four cases would be only $9,600. This can be contrasted to
spending 40 hours completing the big payout cases of Case 12 and
Case 3. Just as the plaintiff's lawyer wants to bring in the bigger
profits early to have the money available for working capital or in-
vestment, so also the defendant's lawyer wants to retain the big
payouts until later in order to have that money available for working
capital or investment.
At second glance, sequencing the cases in the order of their
payouts would be as bad from a defense perspective as it would be
from a plaintiff perspective. The defense lawyer who is usually an
attorney for an insurance company would be much better serving his
or her insurance firm by sequencing the cases in the order of their
detriments/costs ratio taking the cases with the lowest ratios first.
That means the insurance firm lawyers (if they feel an obligation to
put in 40 hours) should first work on Case 9 which has a 1.50 detri-
ments/cost ratio. That would consume 30 hours and result in a pay-
out of $4,500. The insurance company attorney should then work on
Case 6 for the remaining ten hours. That will result in a prorated
payout of one third of 55 or 18 detriment units, or $1,800. The total
payout will then be only $6,300 as contrasted to taking Cases 1, 4, 7,
and 10 which generate a payout of $9,600.
If lawyers for plaintiffs seek to maximize their profits, then the
cases with the highest benefit/cost ratios will get pushed for early
resolution. If defense lawyers for insurance companies seek to maxi-
mize their profits, then the cases with the lowest ratios will get
pushed for early resolution, although the insurance companies would
prefer to have zero losing cases resolved if that were possible. The
important point here is that both sides cannot completely succeed in
their opposite strategies. This is a key reason why a plaintiff's attor-
ney cannot start a case on one day and keep working at it until it is
finished. That does not happen partly because completing the case
may require waiting for the defense side who is in no hurry to coop-
erate. It may also require waiting for the court system which has its
own backlog and sequencing strategies. Nevertheless, one should still
try for optimum sequencing. When one tries for the optimum and
only half succeeds, one has still achieved a lot more than if one tries
for less than the optimum and only half succeeds.
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B. Lawyers in Criminal Cases
One can also use Table 1 to illustrate optimum sequencing in crimi-
nal cases from either a prosecutor or defense attorney perspective.
The prosecutor in criminal cases in this context is like the plaintiff in
civil cases. The prosecutor gets glory from winning big cases. Prose-
cutors like to win big cases as early in their terms as possible so as to
bask in that, glory for as long as possible. Basking in glory is to prose-
cutors what interest or return on monetary investment is to attor-
neys who specialize in bringing damage cases. Suppose the benefits
column from the prosecutor's perspective represents years of impris-
onment. The prosecutor should thus sequence the cases in the order
of their benefit/cost ratios. Doing so will result in maximizing total
imprisonment years which can be used as a rough measure of how
well a prosecutor is doing.
From the defense attorney's perspective, the object is to get the
sentences down as low as possible where there is going to be a convic-
tion. All the cases in Table 1 involve convictions. We could have ad-
ded some nonconviction cases by just inserting some zeros in column
4. We could have similarly added some nonliability civil cases. As
with the civil defense attorney, criminal defense attorneys should be
interested in keeping their capital punishment cases from being con-
summated more than their shoplifting cases. Likewise, a life impris-
onment case is more of a loss than 30 days in jail, and one would
expect defense attorneys to want to delay the embarrassment and re-
grets that are associated with having one's client sentenced to prison
for life or a lengthy term. Assuming the defense attorney does want
to minimize total prison time relative to the hours the defense attor-
ney has available, then he or she should push the cases that have the
lowest detriments/costs ratios, or ratios of prison years to attorney
hours. That means taking Case 9 first and then one third of Case 6
for the coming 40 hour week.
C. Sequencing From the Client's Perspective
We have analyzed the sequencing problems of Table 1 from the
perspective of the civil plaintiff's lawyer, civil defendant's lawyer,
criminal prosecutor, and criminal defense attorney. What about the
perspective of the client? In all these situations, the optimum se-
quencing from a lawyer's perspective is also the optimum sequencing
from the total clientele perspective, although not necessarily from
the perspective of any individual client. For example, the optimum
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strategy of the civil plaintiff's lawyer is to take Case 2 first, then Case
7, and then half of 11. Doing so will maximize benefits gained at 121
units. The benefits column sums to 572 units. That means other cli-
ents will be unhappy to the extent of 572 minus 121 units or 451 units
of deprived benefits. There is, however, no better way that the plain-
tiff's lawyer could sequence the cases in order to provide less than
451 units of unhappiness or more than 121 units of happiness. This
assumes working a 40 hour week and that the predicted hours and
benefits are reasonably accurate. The same analysis can be applied to
showing the harmony between the civil defense attorney, the prose-
cutor, and the criminal defense attorney and their respective clients
or salary payers.
The above analysis about the harmony between the interests of
lawyers and their clients assumes that the benefits column in Table 1
represents benefits for both the lawyer and the client. If, however,
the lawyer is getting paid an hourly fee which is dependent solely on
the number of hours worked, rather than the benefits achieved, then
the optimum sequencing might at first glance appear to involve tak-
ing the cases that have the most hours first. That, however, would
not make sense since the lawyer would presumably be paid a certain
amount of dollars an hour regardless whether it is an hour spent on a
10 hour case or 20 hour case. Therefore, even under an hourly rate,
the lawyer can justify sequencing the cases in the order of their B/C
ratios. Doing so maximizes the client happiness (as mentioned
above) which should be an important consideration in lawyer deci-
sion-making.
One might also at first glance think that under a flat fee arrange-
ment, a lawyer should sequence the cases to take the shortest cases
first. That would make sense if the lawyer were being paid the same
flat fee for all twelve cases, with no payment until each case is com-
pleted. If, however, the payment is at the time the case is accepted,
then there is nothing to be gained by taking the shortest cases first.
Therefore the lawyer who is paid flat fees in advance should se-
quence the cases in the order of their B/C ratios so as to maximize
client happiness, and thereby increase repeat customers and refer-
rals. The same is true if the lawyer is paid flat fees, but the flat fee
tends to correlate with the predicted benefits. Under those circum-
stances, even if the lawyer is paid only after the case is completed,
the sequencing should still be by B/C ratios in order to bring in early
the bigger benefits and thus the bigger flat fees.
When sequencing cases, the interests of lawyers and their clients
tend to be in harmony. That is not necessarily so when it comes to
arriving at an optimum level of time to devote to each case as will be
discussed later in this article.
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IV. ADDITIONAL CRITERIA SUCH As CASE ENJOYMENT
The above sequencing principles operate on the assumption that
law firms amd lawyers want to maximize their income minus ex-
penses or benefits minus costs subject to ethical constraints, includ-
ing maximum time constraints on processing the less desirable cases
that one has accepted. The sequencing approach needs to be modi-
fied, however, if a law firm or a lawyer gets nonmonetary pleasures
out of certain casetypes or cases more so than others. We might want
to add a column to Table 1 that seeks to measure enjoyment received
on a 1-5 scale. On such a scale, a 5 means strong positive enjoyment,
a 4 means mild positive enjoyment, a 3 means neither pleasure nor
displeasure, a 2 means mild displeasure, and a 1 means strong
displeasure.
If we insert a column called psychological enjoyment benefits, we
could not add the scores in that column to the scores in the dollar-
benefits column to obtain a total benefits score. Likewise, we cannot
subtract dollar costs from enjoyments benefits. We can, however,
convert enjoyment benefits, dollar benefits, and dollar costs into
dimensionless part/whole percentages by dividing each criterion fig-
ure per case by the total shown in the column. Doing so creates a set
of percentages that can be meaningfully added and subtracted. If the
lawyers can say how much more psychological enjoyment is worth to
them than gaining dollar income or saving dollar costs this can be
done effectively. If psychological enjoyment is worth twice as much,
then the part/whole percentages in the enjoyment column all get
multiplied by 2. Weighted part/whole percentages are generally eas-
ier for people to handle than trying to attach a monetary value to the
1-5 enjoymEnt units. Those ideas are implemented in columns 4-7 of
Table 2.
When combining monetary and nonmonetary goals as Table 2 does,
one should first combine $B and $C into a single monetary goal of $B
and $C. The nonmonetary goals should also be combined if they are
measured on the same scale, such as a 1-5 scale. If the non-monetary
goals on the same scale differ in importance, one should indicate the
relative weight of each non-monetary goal, and then multiply the
scale scores by those weights when making the nonmonetary combi-
nation. By combining the monetary goals and the nonmonetary goals
that can be combined, we thereby reduce the analysis in Table 2 to
one composite monetary goal and as few nonmonetary goals as possi-
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ble. We can then subject the scores to part/whole percentaging in or-
der to convert the raw scores into dimensionless numbers.
Column 8 shows the sum of the weighted part/whole percentages
for each case. Each of those sums is arrived at by taking the part/
whole percentage for the B-C difference shown in column 5 and ad-
ding it to twice the part/whole percentage for the enjoyment score
shown in column 7. Those figures in column 8 can be referred to as
showing percentage benefits minus percentage costs or %B-%C. One
would, however, not want to sequence the cases in the order of the
column 8 numbers any more than one would want to sequence the
cases in Table 1 in the order of the B-C differences. Sequencing by
B-C or %B-%C does not maximize overall benefits minus costs. It
does not take into consideration that the case with the highest B-C or
%B-%C may also consume a large quantity of hours and inefficiently
leave no time for handling other highly profitable cases.
To consider the quantity of hours in sequencing the cases, one
needs to divide B-C by hours in Table 1 and divide %B-%C by hours
in Table 2. That is done in column 9. It shows that the best order in
which to process the cases for the first 40-hour week is Case 12 first,
which uses 31) hours. We then have a choice of either Case 2 or Case
11, both of which have a score of 1.60 on (%B-%C)/Hours. Both cases
also happen to take 20 hours. One can therefore complete the 40
hours by doing half the 10 hours of work on either Case 2 or Case 11.
The result will be 49 plus 16% profit units. There is no other combi-
nation of 40 hours that will add to more than those 65% profit units.
If, for example, one were to take Case 23 and the next more profita-
ble case, which is Case 6, that would mean 49% profit units plus one
third of 34 or 11% profit units for Case 6. The total would then be
only 60% profit units, rather than 65.
The analysis in Table 2 enables one to meaningfully combine crite-
ria that are measured in dollars (like the B-C difference) and other
relevant criteria that are measured on a different scale (like psycho-
logical enjoyment). The arithmetic, however, requires a bit more ef-
fort than Table 1 where all the criteria are measured in dollars.
Even so, the arithmetic is no more complicated than calculating and
adding percentages, rather than raw scores. The arithmetic can be
made easier using a microcomputer program called Policy/Goal
Percentaging. The user inputs into a microcomputer (along with the
program) the predicted benefits and costs for each case and a psycho-
logical enjoyment score. The microcomputer then displays informa-
tion like that shown in Table 2 to enable the user-lawyer or legal
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administrator to schedule the cases accordingly. Doing so will result
in bringing in the biggest monetary and nonmonetary profits as early
as possible so one can invest the money and enjoy the psychological
pleasures with many returns thereafter. That would not be possible
if those profits and pleasures were needlessly delayed through bad
scheduling.
V. ALLOCATING TIME PER CASE
The main purpose of this article is to discuss the optimum sequenc-
ing of cases, rather than how much time should be optimally allo-
cated to each case. The time allocating problem is an interesting one,
but it has been previously discussed in law reviews, by this author
and others, unlike the sequencing problem. Time allocating is also a
simpler problem, although one that raises trickier ethical questions.
With the data from Table 1, one can logically say that the optimum
time for cases of casetype A is 30 hours; for casetype B, anything be-
tween 20 and 30 hours; for casetype C, 20 hours; and for casetype D,
30 hours. Those figures are arrived at by noting which case or time
interval gives the most profit. With only three cases per casetype, we
do not have a very large sample for generalizing. It would be much
better to have a few dozen cases per casetype. We could then arrange
the cases in the order of their billable hours, and then observe
through simple graphing at what level of billable hours profit tends
to be maximized. For most casetypes where there is a relation be-
tween hours and benefits received, the profit or B-C difference would
go up as more hours are devoted to bringing in more benefits, but
then profit would go down as the hours become excessive relative to
the diminishing returns. The same reasoning applies to Table 2
where nonmonetary criteria are involved, except that for each
casetype, we would pick the level of hours corresponding to the max-
imum %B-%C, rather than $B-$C.
Ethical problems occur in time allocation because the interests of
the lawyer in maximizing the profits of the firm may not be congru-
ent with the interests of clients in maximizing their benefits minus
costs. This is contrary to the sequencing situation where the inter-
ests do tend to be congruent. Under an hourly rate, a lawyer might
have a tendency to work more hours than under a contingency fee or
flat fee to the benefit of the lawyer's income, but to the detriment of
the client's expenses. Likewise, under a flat fee, the lawyer might
have a tendency to work as few hours as possible to reduce the law-
yer's expenses thereby benefitting the lawyer. This will be a detri-
ment to the client's possible future award. Even under a contingency
fee or a case in which the lawyer gets paid in proportion to the bene-
fits obtained for the client, there may be a conflict of interest,
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although they share in the benefits. This is so because only the law-
yer bears the expenses for the hours put in, not the client. This
could cause lawyers to hold back on additional hours in order to max-
imize their benefits minus costs which are not the same as the bene-
fits minus costs of the clients. The best remedy for these potential
conflicts is probably not stronger ethical guidelines for attorneys, but
instead more price and advertising competition among attorneys.
Consumers are less likely to be taken advantage of when they can do
meaningful comparison shopping among attorneys offering different
rates and forms of service.
Sequencing the cases to indicate the order in which they should be
processed is clearly different from allocating time to each case. Both
forms of time management are different from allocating a fixed
amount of resources. Time in one sense is not a scarce resource. In-
dividuals have their lifetime, which usually means about 70 years
from birth, 50 years from beginning law practice, and 25 years from
the prime of law practice. Thus, if one runs out of time this week,
there will be more time available next week. An individual or firm
can also hire additional people, thereby acquiring more time for han-
dling incoming cases. Therefore if a lawyer turns down a case for
lack of time, it means (1) the case could be processed eventually, but
the delay would be too long relative to the statute of limitations or
other maximum constraints, (2) the case might never be processed
because the lawyer anticipates there will be a continuous inflow of
more profitable and more interesting cases such that the case under
consideration will always be pushed back, or (3) the case is not worth
hiring additional personnel to process.
One should also note that time allocation means allocating time per
case not per casetype. For example, suppose one has two casetypes.
Suppose also that the first casetype is twice as profitable as the sec-
ond in the sense that (1) the average case from the first casetype
brings in a profit of $20,000, whereas the average case from the sec-
ond casetype brings in a profit of only $10,000, or (2) the B/C ratio of
the first casetype is 8 to 1, whereas the B/C ratio of the second
casetype is only 4 to 1. One would not necessarily allocate twice as
much time to the first casetype because the amount of time one
would allocate to the first and second casetypes would depend partly
on how many cases there were of each type. More important, one al-
ways allocates time to cases, not to casetypes. One also allocates the
amount of time which analysis of that casetype has shown tends to
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maximize benefits minus costs, borrowing from next week if
necessary.
An important distinction between time allocation to cases and
money allocation to activities or places is the fact that case allocation
generally involves an optimum level problem, where doing too much
or too little is undesirable. Allocating to activities or places, however,
generally involves an optimum mix problem, where the object is to
allocate the resources to the activities or places in light of their di-
minishing marginal returns. It thus makes sense to switch some
funding from more efficient activities or places to less efficient ones
because the marginal or incremental returns from the more efficient
places have plateaued out, but the marginal returns from the less ef-
ficient places are still substantial. Under those circumstances, one
generally wants to allocate to the activities (X1 and X2) in proportion
to their elasticity coefficients or exponents in equations of the form Y
= a(Xi)bl(X2 )b2, where Y is a composite goal to be achieved. The ac-
tivities or places are not so likely to involve diminishing absolute re-
turns where profits go up until they reach a peak and then go down
as contrasted to tapering off. This is unlike allocating to cases where
the profits do go down as a result of the benefits tapering off while
the expenses rise with additional hours or other inputs. This is a
more important distinction than saying that more time comes later
since in most budgeting problems more money also comes later.
Likewise, one can hire or borrow additional money analogous to hir-
ing or borrowing the time of additional people.
V. SOME CONCLUSIONS
We thus have three kinds of allocation problems covering:
1. Sequencing of cases or activities in order to maximize benefits minus costs
for a given time period or to reduce delay.
2. Allocating to cases where doing too much or too little is undesirable, and
each case is viewed as a separate optimum level problem.
3. Allocating to activities or places where an optimum mix across the activi-
ties or places is needed in order to consider their diminishing marginal
returns.
Those three kinds of allocation can be applied to a wide variety of
situations in efficiently operating a law firm, a court system, a gov-
ernment agency, or other entities. One point that needs emphasis is
that those methods can bring increased monetary and non-monetary
benefits minus costs without incurring substantial risks or invest-
ment. Normally, to increase one's net benefits or profits, one has to
be willing to take chances or spend substantial funds or other re-
sources to obtain the increased net benefits or profits which come
from optimum sequencing and optimum time allocating; however,
one simply needs to be more systematic in the processing of cases, es-
pecially the scheduling of them. It is hoped that this article will con-
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tribute to the increased use of those systematic methods for
increasing the net benefits of law practice and related activities.4
4. For literature on finding an optimum mix in allocating resources across activi-
ties or places, see C. MCMILLAN, JR., MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE DESIGN AND APPLICATION OF OPTIMAL DECISION MACHINES (1970); F.
BELTRAMI, MODELS FOR PUBLIC SYSTEMS ANALYSIS (1977); W. KELLY, URBAN SYSTEMS
MODELS (1975). See also S. NAGEL, POLICY EVALUATION: MAKING OPTIMUM DECISIONS
179-254 (1982).
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